Historian Victor Davis Hanson’s most recent book, The End of Everything: How Wars Descend into Annihilation looks at four historical examples of where a conflict has resulted in the complete collapse and eradication of an entire civilisation. Ancient Thebes, Carthage, the Byzantine Empire, and the Aztecs all disappeared because of wars that took a disastrous turn.
Other wars that occupy the popular imagination, such as the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the second world war, similarly ended in the complete defeat of one side. Each of those wars ended with victorious soldiers occupying the capitals of the various losers.
Most wars do not end in complete victory or defeat. They end in an indecisive and potentially unsatisfying ceasefire, armistice or peace treaty. That will almost certainly be the fate of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
But history also suggests that as a conflict gets closer to an inevitable ceasefire it can become more dangerous. A ceasefire might freeze international borders wherever the fighting stops, so a scramble for land can occur as the end draws near. And battlefield realities – facts on the ground – can greatly shape the ensuing peace treaty. So, both sides might jockey to improve their position at the negotiating table by improving their position on the battlefield.
This was the case in the drawn-out conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. As an inevitable ceasefire loomed closer, the communist forces launched major offensives to grab as much land as possible, which were vigorously defended by American-led forces. This tragically led to much bloodshed shortly before these conflicts concluded.
This scramble for territory might have been a motivation behind Ukraine’s recent offensive into Russian territory near the city of Kursk, site of the famous second world war tank battle. Almost all the recent fighting in that conflict has taken place in the Donbas region, internationally recognised as Ukrainian territory. Russia continues to slowly advance forward on that front. Ukraine’s gambit into Russian territory has changed the facts on the ground for when peace talks resume.
In the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, Egypt launched a surprise attack across the Suez Canal, driving Israeli forces from parts of the Sinai they controlled at the time. Israel stabilised the line, and after weeks of bloody conflict, there were international calls for a ceasefire. This would have frozen the conflict with Egyptian soldiers ensconced in the Sinai, with no incentive to return to the lines from which the conflict started.
But Israel did not accept a ceasefire and launched its own assault across the Suez to the south, taking control of Egyptian territory. The terms of the ensuing ceasefire were that both sides would return to the starting front lines. Egypt would not have given up the territory it had taken earlier in the war unless it had been forced to trade it away to evict Israeli troops from its territory.
In Ukraine, Russian forces occupy about 20 per cent of the country. If the conflict were frozen now, then Ukrainians and their Western backers would rightly feel that Putin’s aggression had been rewarded. But Ukraine has been unable to evict the Russians from their territory, and Russia has little motivation to give up what they have taken so far.
However, Ukraine’s new move into Russian territory, if they can hold onto it, gives them a bargaining chip when peace talks resume. If history is a guide, further escalation is likely the closer a ceasefire approaches.
The lessons from this war for our region are clear. For aggressors, although a complete victory is theoretically possible, it is rare that a war results in anybody getting all that they want. The costs are inevitably higher than expected, and wars are far easier to start than to satisfactorily end.
For Australia, the one and only time our national territory was genuinely threatened, by the Japanese during the second world war, our powerful ally – the United States – rescued us and crushed and completely defeated the Japanese aggressors. This happy ending (for us) is not how most wars pan out.
The Ukraine war is proving Sun-Tzu’s famous dictum: ‘There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.’ Deterring aggressors is far less costly than defeating them in war.
The Australian military today is arguably the weakest and least prepared for a major war than it has ever been. The cost necessary to change this and restore deterrence will be high; the cost of fighting a war far higher. As Victor Hanson reminds us, on rare occasions war can cost everything.
John Storey is the Director of Law and Policy at the Institute of Public Affairs and author of Big Wars – why do they happen and when will the next one be?
