The images of thousands of Moroccans pouring across the border into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta should be understood as more than another European argument about immigration. Those images are a stark reminder that what happens at Europe’s southern border is inseparable from the political and security conditions beyond it. Europe can strengthen its borders, change its asylum laws, and increase deportations, but it cannot isolate itself from instability across the Middle East and North Africa.
The scenes in Ceuta point to a larger problem. Europe’s southern border is increasingly exposed to the consequences of instability across the Middle East and North Africa, where regional rivalries, weak states, armed groups, and political coercion reinforce one another. Any serious discussion of how that instability has been sustained must eventually confront the role of the Islamic regime occupying Iran.
For almost half a century, the Islamic regime in Iran has pursued a foreign policy that deliberately projects power beyond Iran’s borders. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force have built, armed, and financed networks across the Middle East. Hezbollah in Lebanon is the clearest example. Iran has also supported armed groups in Iraq and Syria, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis in Yemen. This has allowed Tehran to confront its opponents without fighting conventional wars itself. The costs, however, are borne across the region.
The Syrian war displaced millions, and Tehran’s military intervention helped sustain Assad’s regime through years of conflict. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s military power outside normal state control has weakened the authority of the Lebanese state. Iranian-backed militias have similarly constrained state authority in Iraq, while the Houthis have attacked commercial shipping in the Red Sea, forcing vessels to change routes and increasing the cost of international trade. Tehran did not initiate every conflict in which it became involved. What it has repeatedly done is exploit existing divisions, arm non-state actors, and prolong conflicts that serve its strategic interests.
Instability does not remain where it begins. War displaces people. Political breakdown damages economies. Weak states provide opportunities for organised crime, extremists and people smugglers. Attacks on shipping affect trade. Economic decline increases the incentive to leave. These pressures move through neighbouring countries and eventually reach Europe.
The pressure does not stop at the Middle East. In North Africa, the long-running rivalry between Morocco and Algeria has created another fault line close to Europe’s southern border. Their border is closed and diplomatic relations are severed. Algeria supports the Polisario Front in its dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara, while Morocco regards the territory as part of the kingdom. Iran’s role in this dispute has been more than rhetorical. In 2018, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Tehran after accusing Iran of using Hezbollah to provide Polisario fighters with weapons and military training through the Iranian embassy in Algeria. Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said the support included weapons transfers and training by Hezbollah personnel. Iran, Hezbollah, Algeria, and Polisario denied the allegations, and the claims have not been independently established. Nonetheless, this episode shows how Tehran’s network of proxies has extended beyond the Middle East into a dispute sitting directly on Europe’s southern flank.
Spain depends heavily on Morocco to control migration towards Ceuta, Melilla, and the Spanish mainland. That gives Morocco considerable leverage. Europe has already seen what happens when that cooperation is withdrawn. During a diplomatic dispute between Morocco and Spain in 2021, Moroccan authorities relaxed border controls and thousands of people entered Ceuta within a short period. Whatever one thinks about immigration policy, the lesson was difficult to miss; migration can be used as political pressure.
Yes, Spain has an obvious responsibility to control its own borders. A country that cannot decide who enters its territory has surrendered part of its sovereignty. European governments also need immigration and asylum systems that distinguish clearly between lawful migration, genuine asylum claims, and illegal entry. But stronger borders address only what happens when instability reaches Europe. They do nothing about where that instability begins.
This is where Western policy towards Iran has failed. For decades, Western governments have treated each manifestation of the Islamic Republic as a separate crisis. They have sanctioned the IRGC, intercepted the weapons, contained the proxies, protected shipping, and negotiated the nuclear program. However, the underlying problem remains unchanged; the Islamic Republic continues to exist, leaving the West to manage the consequences of its behaviour. After forty-seven years, there is little reason to believe this approach will produce a different Iran.
One reason Western governments remain reluctant to contemplate the end of the Islamic Republic is their fear of what comes afterwards. Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan have understandably made Western governments wary of political collapse in the Middle East. But Iran is a very different case. It is an ancient nation-state with a strong national identity, an educated population, a substantial professional and technical class, a large diaspora with the expertise and resources to contribute to reconstruction, and most importantly, a population that has moved beyond the Islamic regime occupying Iran. Treating Iran as another Iraq or Libya ignores these fundamental differences. At the same time, an uncontrolled collapse would carry serious risks. Iran has more than 90 million people, significant military capabilities, major energy resources, and a key geographic position.
That concern should lead to preparation, not continued acceptance and negotiation with the Islamic Republic. After nearly half a century of failed attempts to moderate the regime’s behaviour, repeating the same approach is no longer caution. It is a refusal to learn from experience. The question the international community should be asking is straightforward; if the regime falls, what political structure is ready to prevent a vacuum?
The answer need not be invented. Much of the groundwork already exists. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has already moved beyond simply calling for the end of the Islamic Republic. Under his leadership, extensive work has been undertaken to prepare for the transition that would follow it. Through the Iran Prosperity Project, Iranian specialists have worked on plans covering the economy, energy, public administration, and other areas necessary to stabilise and rebuild the country after the fall of the Islamic regime. That work has also included the development of a transitional structure intended to maintain continuity of government and lead Iran towards a democratic constitutional process, with the immediate task of preserving Iran’s territorial integrity, preventing the collapse of essential institutions, establishing civilian authority and maintaining basic government services.
Planning is therefore no longer the central question. Recognition is. The next major step should be for democratic governments to recognise a transitional Iranian authority under Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and begin dealing with it as the political alternative to the Islamic Republic. This idea is beginning to enter political discussion in the United States. The question is shifting from whether the Islamic Republic can somehow be managed to whether the democratic world should formally support an organised Iranian alternative. That discussion should now take place openly in Washington, London, Canberra, and European capitals. International recognition would make the alternative tangible.
A democratic and secular Iran would remove one of the main drivers of regional instability. The resources now spent arming Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other militias could instead be directed towards rebuilding Iran, restoring its economy, and reconnecting the country with the region and the wider world. Iranian foreign policy could once again be shaped by Iran’s national interests rather than by the survival and expansion of an Islamist revolutionary ideology.
While a democratic Iran may not resolve the Morocco-Algeria dispute, its effects would reach far beyond Iran’s borders. It could become a source of stability rather than conflict, rebuild normal relations with its neighbours, and contribute to regional trade and energy security. The impact would be felt from the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean to Europe itself. A country whose resources have for decades been used to export terror and instability could instead become a major force for regional stability and cooperation.
Europe cannot separate its security from what happens beyond its borders. Instability travels, and eventually it arrives at Europe’s shores. For 47 years, the democratic world has asked how it can live with the Islamic Republic. It is time to ask a different question; how can the democratic world help bring about a stable, democratic Iran after the Islamic Republic?
The answer begins by acknowledging that an alternative exists and having the courage to formally recognise it.
It is time for Europe to end its policy of appeasement, support the Iranian people in their struggle to end the Islamic regime, and respond to the demands they have repeatedly expressed through petitions, demonstrations and public campaigns by expelling regime diplomats and closing the Islamic regime’s embassies. Europe must engage seriously with the political structure being prepared for the transition and take the decisive step that would give that alternative international legitimacy by formally recognising a transitional government under the leadership of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.
Pejman Amirnejad is a Sydney-based Australian-Iranian, community advocate.
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