Image courtesy of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China. Xi Jinping at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

 

Free weapons for some and crippling loans for others—Beijing is back on its diplomatic offensive to counter the U.S.

At the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held from September 4 to 6, Chinese leader Xi Jinping urged African nations to recommit to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), despite widespread criticisms labeling the project a debt trap. While Beijing denies these accusations, around 60% of low-income countries are facing debt distress, with BRI loans often being the tipping point. Many projects remain unfinished, and others provide little to no benefit to local populations in the debtor countries. The loans, however, create opportunities for corruption and no-strings-attached cash enrichment for authoritarian leaders who personally benefit, making Chinese loans more attractive in some instances than U.S. aid.

The slogan for the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), “A Shared Future for China and Africa,” reflects Beijing’s attempt to position itself as the anti-colonial savior of the continent. This is ironic, considering the United States has never had a colony in Africa, yet China frames its engagement as rescuing Africa from supposed American “colonialism.” Alongside promises of trade and investment, Beijing pledged $150 million in military aid to Africa. However, the term “aid” highlights a key difference between U.S. and Chinese approaches to engagement with the developing world. When the U.S. provides aid, it is typically in the form of a grant or gift. In contrast, much of what China calls “aid” consists of concessionary loans, often at interest and backed by natural resources, further entrenching economic dependencies.

In the past few years, several African countries have moved closer to China’s sphere of influence, primarily driven by Beijing’s economic investments and infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Angola have strengthened ties with China through these initiatives, which often offer easier financing than Western aid, typically tied to conditions related to democratization and human rights. For instance, Zimbabwe, under Western sanctions for human rights violations, turned to China for economic and political support, securing investments in projects like hydropower and airport infrastructure, free from the political stipulations that typically accompany Western aid packages.

Sudan, similarly isolated by Western sanctions, has become increasingly dependent on China for investments, particularly in its vital oil industry, while also relying on Beijing’s diplomatic backing in international forums like the United Nations. This support has helped Sudan maintain a degree of economic stability despite global pressures and isolation from Western financial systems. Meanwhile, South Africa, a member of both BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has also moved closer to China’s sphere of influence. The two countries have strengthened their strategic ties, exemplified by joint military drills conducted with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This military cooperation reflects South Africa’s growing alignment with Beijing’s geopolitical vision, further solidifying its role as a key partner in China’s global strategy.

Eritrea, long isolated due to its human rights record, has also strengthened ties with China, benefiting from investments in its mining sector and military cooperation. These developments have provided Eritrea with much-needed economic and political support without the stringent conditions typically imposed by Western powers. Djibouti, strategically located along key global shipping routes, hosts China’s first overseas military base, symbolizing the growing military and economic alignment between the two nations. Meanwhile, Angola, still recovering from its civil war, has become heavily reliant on Chinese loans and investments, particularly in the oil sector, deepening its economic ties with Beijing.

China’s approach to African nations—offering infrastructure development without the political conditions commonly imposed by Western countries—has enabled it to expand its influence across the continent. This strategy, often described as a non-interference policy, allows China to engage with governments without pressuring them on issues like democratization or human rights. By providing diplomatic support, making strategic investments in sectors like energy and mining, and fostering military cooperation, China has cultivated strong relationships and growing partnerships. China’s willingness to offer financial backing without demanding governance reforms or transparency has made its investments particularly attractive to leaders of countries seeking development but wary of Western oversight.

On the other side of the world, earlier in the week, China gifted two warships to Cambodia, enhancing the country’s naval capabilities at the strategically important Ream Naval Base. This move is part of Beijing’s broader strategy to expand its military presence and influence across Southeast Asia, while simultaneously undermining U.S. influence in the region. The Ream Naval Base, which has been undergoing Chinese-backed expansions, is a critical asset due to its location along key maritime routes. This gesture by China is in line with its efforts to build an anti-Western axis, heightening regional tensions and challenging the U.S. and its allies’ dominance in both Asia and Africa. By strengthening Cambodia’s naval power, China is reinforcing its strategic foothold in the Indo-Pacific, further escalating the geopolitical competition in the region.

China is buying friends and influencing countries in Africa and Asia, building an axis and threatening U.S. foreign policy in two strategic regions.

The post China’s Military and Economic Diplomacy Undermining U.S. Influence in Africa and Asia appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

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