The dramatic call on News24 by the editor, Rowan Dean, for the Governor-General to dismiss the Albanese government has fallen on deaf ears.
Among Australia’s modern legal establishment, it is an article of faith that the Governor-General is a mere ceremonial automaton – a ribbon-cutter whose discretion is possibly confined to a Senate blockage of supply or, at most, persistent illegality, as with NSW Premier Jack Lang in May 1932. Outside these textbook categories, they say the King’s representative must rubber-stamp ministerial advice, whatever the consequences.
Yet that consensus mistakes political preference for constitutional law. Under the Australian Constitution – and the suppressed jurisprudence of its principal architect, Sir Samuel Griffith – a governor-general retains a wider, strictly non-justiciable reserve power to dismiss a government threatening serious, irreparable national harm, provided an alternative caretaker is available to advise an immediate election.
To understand why this doctrine was buried, consider how thoroughly Australia’s constitutional architecture has been reshaped since Federation. In 1920, a High Court majority – influenced by those who failed at the 1897–98 Convention to impose a far more centralised unitary model on the six states – staged a judicial coup in the Engineers case, authoring the lead and concurring judgments. Treating the Constitution as an ordinary British statute rather than a federal compact, the majority overturned the foundational doctrines of implied immunities and reserved state powers established by its first three justices – Griffith, Barton, and O’Connor. They even banned using the Conventions’ Hansard to assist in interpretation. A century of centralist jurisprudence followed, reducing the Commonwealth to a fake federation of fiscal mendicants while law schools treated the Framers’ original intentions as an inconvenience.
Those intentions survive in black and white. In 1916, amid first-world-war political turmoil, Governor-General Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson sought confidential advice from then-Chief Justice Griffith on vice-regal discretion. Griffith flatly rejected the notion that a governor-general must always follow ministerial advice. Where a ministry persisted in threatening irreparable injury to the nation or Constitution while refusing to face electors, Griffith maintained the governor-Ggneral possessed not just a power, but a duty to dismiss the government.
Crucially, Griffith emphasised two features of this power. First, rather than an instrument of vice-regal autocracy, it was an emergency circuit-breaker referring crises back to the people. As Griffith wrote in May 1916, upon dismissal, ‘it is the electorate which will decide whether or not the dismissed ministry will or will not be returned to office’. Second, this reserve power was completely non-justiciable. No court – however centralist its post-Engineers posture – could review, enjoin, or invalidate a governor-general’s revocation of a prime minister’s commission.
Whether an incumbent would ever invoke such a power depends on who occupies Yarralumla – and whether appointment conventions are observed. Under the 1930 Imperial Conference protocol, a prime minister must sound out the Sovereign informally before formally advising an appointment, ensuring the Crown knows the nominee’s suitability. Notably, when the present Governor-General, Sam Mostyn, was invited to accept the office in 2024, her long-standing, ardent republicanism – alongside years of ‘progressive’ commentary – was abruptly scrubbed, her social media accounts wiped clean before the announcement. In any proper sounding, the King should have been candidly advised of her strong republican convictions – especially her support for the tainted 1999 model – before appointing her as his personal representative.
Before any question of dismissal arises, however, the governor-general holds Walter Bagehot’s classic rights: to be consulted, to encourage, and to warn. Unless she has chosen to remain a passive spectator, she should have exercised those rights – raising and, if need be, warning the Prime Minister over his alleged inappropriate conduct, persistent allegations of dishonesty, and serious questions of impropriety, from the golf course affair to Western Australian Senator Fatima Payman’s vote.
Whatever the incumbent’s inclinations, the constitutional mechanics remain unaltered. Critics of Griffith’s doctrine object that a governor-general cannot dismiss a prime minister commanding a lower-house majority because no alternative government could survive. Yet as Sir John Kerr demonstrated, that objection vanishes if the new prime minister is appointed strictly as a caretaker to advise an election, holding the ring while voters deliver their verdict.
Nor is a governor-general obliged to warn the prime minister or Buckingham Palace before acting, as 11 November 1975 settles. Sir John Kerr rightly gave Gough Whitlam no advance warning – indeed, none was needed. As opposition leader, Whitlam had regularly insisted that a government denied money bills must resign. With supply running out after his attempts to raise funds through trading banks collapsed, Whitlam – a Queen’s Counsel – knew he must resign or be dismissed. An early warning would simply have triggered a race to the Palace to revoke Kerr’s commission.
This is the one theoretical counter-move open to a prime minister sensing danger before Yarralumla acts: advising the King to terminate the Governor-General’s commission. As the 2020 ‘Palace Letters’ confirmed, Palace officials held that the Sovereign must ultimately act on a sitting prime minister’s formal advice. I disagree: the Sovereign retains an ultimate reserve power—and, in any event, constitutional history favours a resolute governor-general over a panicking prime minister. The Palace is built for deliberation, verification, and caution – not instantaneous dismissal over the telephone. When the Irish Free State’s Prime Minister, Éamon de Valera, clashed with Governor-General James McNeill in 1932 and sought his removal, King George V did not execute an overnight sacking. Through careful royal correspondence, the Sovereign delayed the outcome for months until a negotiated retirement on 1 November 1932. In a modern crisis, a prime minister racing to London faces a monarch entitled to consider the advice – giving Yarralumla room to act first.
No governor-general would invoke Griffith’s irreparable-harm doctrine lightly. Controversies such as the Isis brides affair and the rushed entry of arrivals from Gaza arguably raised such questions. Yet Australians should not have to rely solely on vice-regal courage when a government loses the nation’s trust.
The point surely is that we do not elect governments for a fixed term: they hold office ‘at pleasure’ – which should be the people’s pleasure, easily achieved.
Despite commentariat insistence that One Nation lacks policies, one of their foundation policies is to empower the people with citizen-initiated referendums. This could be extended to a right to force a recall election against any politician or government.
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