The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that Myanmar’s atrocities against the Rohingya minority breached the terms of the Genocide Convention 1948. This is the first time that a state has been found in breach of the convention. So, on any measure, Gambia v Myanmar is a landmark ruling. It will have significant implications for states around the world, including in relation to South Africa’s ongoing legal claim that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. If the court had found against Gambia, South Africa’s claim would have been almost certain to fail.

The wider significance of the judgment turns on how the ICJ reasoned its way to the conclusion that Myanmar had committed genocide and how this reasoning will be received by future judges and by the states who are party to the convention. The questions that arise are whether, and if so to what extent, the court has changed the test for genocide and, especially, whether it has changed the test for establishing that a state has acted with genocidal intent.

No one disputes that Myanmar has gravely wronged the Rohingya, murdering and raping thousands of people, and forcibly displacing many more. These acts are wrongful acts in every sense – in ordinary criminal law, in basic morality, and in public international law – and can certainly constitute genocidal acts, provided that they are carried out with genocidal intent. The Genocide Convention strictly defines the crime of genocide in terms of acting with the intent of destroying – in whole or in substantial part – a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.

Forcible displacement is not genocide. War crimes are not genocide. The question is not whether the state has violated the human rights of some group but whether it has acted with the relevant mens rea. Establishing that a state has acted with this intent is no easy task. The ICJ’s past case law set the evidential threshold at a high level, insisting in particular that in the absence of direct evidence of genocidal intent (say, when a state boasts of its intentions or its plan to commit genocide is uncovered) circumstantial evidence of genocide must meet a stringent test. For the conduct (killing, rape, etc) to constitute genocide, the only reasonable inference available from the facts must be that the state intended to destroy the group in question, in whole or in (substantial) part.

In a report published in advance of this new judgment, ‘Genocide: The Use and Abuse of a Term’, my Policy Exchange colleagues defended the good sense of this established case law, tracing the origins of the Genocide Convention and critiquing the attempts by some states, such as Ireland, to dilute the term and lower the standard. Happily, the ICJ’s judgment disavows any intention to change the established test. The president of the court even notes in a separate opinion that various states, including the UK, had urged the court to change course, before insisting that the test remains whether an intention is the only reasonable inference.

However, there may be less to this assurance than meets the eye. Or, to put it differently, whether the judgment changes the rules is disputed, including by the judges themselves. In a pivotal but brief paragraph, the majority claims that a genocidal intention may not be the only intention in play. In relation to Myanmar’s conduct, the majority reasoned that Myanmar may have intended both to inflict collective punishment on the Rohingya and to destroy them in part.

This is a complex judgment with an intricate web of separate opinions, dissenting opinions and declarations. In a joint dissent, six judges argued that the majority’s reasoning was in fact inconsistent with the established case law. The majority had asked, these judges said, first whether it was reasonable to infer genocidal intent and then whether any other explanations were reasonable. The risk of this approach, the dissenting judges maintained, was that it made it for the respondent state, in this case Myanmar, in effect to prove that its intentions were not genocidal.

The joint dissent considered closely the majority’s treatment of the evidence and its conclusion that Myanmar’s intention was not to displace the Rohingya or to punish them collectively but instead to destroy them. The majority rejected the argument that Myanmar’s intention was to displace forcibly the Rohingya, rather than to destroy them, partly because the state did not facilitate or organise their displacement, because state forces attacked them on the move, and because the state’s actions were extremely brutal. But these points did not make it unreasonable to infer that Myanmar’s intention was forcible displacement, or, more precisely, they did not establish that the only reasonable inference was genocidal intent.

The ICJ has not repudiated its past case law, which is welcome and important

Relatedly, the dissenting judges accepted that an intent to punish might coincide with a genocidal intent, but they rejected the majority’s reasoning that the scale and brutality of Myanmar’s actions went well beyond what collective punishment required. The question was not whether Myanmar had acted reasonably or proportionately – it obviously had not – but what its intentions were. The problem with the majority’s approach was that it risked prematurely concluding that the intention was genocidal, downplaying or overlooking other explanations for the conduct in question. For the dissenting judges, Myanmar had clearly not used all the opportunities that it had to destroy the Rohingya, which should have made it harder on the facts to establish genocidal intent.

The significance of this critique is that the majority’s reasoning may risk attributing to a state genocidal intent when other explanations are reasonably open. The ICJ has not repudiated its past case law, which is welcome and important. But if the dissenting judges are right – and they make a powerful case – then the judgment’s development of that past case law may result in the relaxation of the standard for proving genocide that the court as a whole says it is concerned to avoid. And such a relaxation may pave the way for other, even more controversial, findings that states have committed genocide, including Israel in Gaza, where extensive civilian suffering and allegations of war crimes may wrongly be transmuted into a finding of genocidal intent.

The post Has the ICJ relaxed the threshold for genocide? appeared first on The Spectator Australia.

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