Not infrequently, Australian politicians suggest that the considerable household deposits in savings accounts, estimated to be $19.21 trillion (mainly driven by the value of land and dwellings), are Australian, not private, assets.

Such suggestions are often made in the context of the need to reduce the $1 trillion debt racked up by successive governments of both persuasions since 2006 when Australia was debt-free.

This spectacular increase in Australia’s debt level, fuelled by government profligacy, generates a debate as to whether these household savings accounts can be accessed by the government for its own purposes.

Typically, this issue comes up when suggestions are made that the superannuation monies of Australians, invested in interest-bearing deposits, are Australian assets that can be used to pursue and implement the government’s preferred projects.

This Australian quandary has received new impetus following the recent comments made by the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, in Paris August 27, at the MEDEF entrepreneurs’ (La Rencontre des Entrepreneurs de France 2026) summit. She reportedly stated:

Today, EUR 10 trillion in household savings are kept in bank accounts. And a large share of Europe’s savings is invested outside our continent. Europe now needs to put these savings to work for its companies. This is the goal of the ‘savings and investment union’. We have tabled proposals on securitisation, on bank and insurance investments, and on the integration and supervision of our markets. Together, these measures could unlock up to EUR 470 billion in additional investment. We now need to reach an agreement, before the end of the year, ideally with all 27 Member States. But if that doesn’t work, if necessary we will do it with those that are ready.

Her statement excoriates the existence of what some call ‘lazy money’, incendiary language softened in the English version of her speech as ‘idle money’.

It is our view that this is more than an economic observation, it is potentially a political and ideological shift with profound consequences for financial stability, public trust, and the very architecture of Europe’s banking system.

If a government were to consider people’s savings accounts to be problematic because, at present, they are not put ‘to work for its companies’, it might hint at securitisation and supervision of these accounts.

Put simply: some fear there may come a time when the European Commission comes for people’s savings!

The idea that household savings are somehow ‘idle’, ‘unproductive’, or ‘wasted’ unless channelled into capital markets is not merely misguided; it is dangerous because it risks undermining the foundational social contract between citizens and their financial institutions. It opens the door to unpalatable policy experiments that could trigger bank runs, destabilise markets, and erode democratic legitimacy.

The European Union has long struggled with sluggish investment, fragmented capital markets, and an over-reliance on bank lending.

Blaming household savers, many of whom are already navigating inflation, rising living costs, and economic uncertainty, for the continent’s investment gap represents an unnecessary attribution of blame and reframes a structural problem as a behavioural one. It also implies that the solution lies not in reforming markets or improving competitiveness, but in ‘mobilising’ private savings that citizens have deliberately placed in low‑risk accounts for security reasons, not speculation.

The term ‘lazy money’ is rhetorically powerful but economically simplistic. Household deposits are not idle. They are the backbone of Europe’s banking system, providing liquidity, stability, and a buffer against shocks. Deposits allow banks to lend, manage risk, and maintain confidence. They are also the primary savings vehicle for millions of Europeans who do not have the financial literacy, risk appetite, or disposable income to participate in capital markets. To call these deposits ‘lazy’ is to misunderstand their purpose. Deposits are not meant to be venture capital. They are meant to be safe investments that secure the financial future of their depositors.

The European Commissioner’s statement suggests that households are failing in their civic duty by not exposing their savings to market risk. But this ignores the reality that Europeans already face precarious financial conditions. According to European Central Bank (ECB) household finance surveys, nearly half of EU households have less than €5,000 in liquid savings. For them, deposits are not idle; they are essential life-sustaining accounts. They are emergency funds, buffers against unemployment, and protection against inflation. They are not waiting to be ‘mobilised’ into corporate bonds or securitised products.

The EU’s broader agenda is Capital Markets Union, Retail Investment Strategy, and securitisation reforms, revealing a clear direction: policymakers want more household money flowing into markets. They argue that Europe needs investment to compete globally, fund green transitions, and support innovation. These goals are legitimate. But the method being hinted at, namely nudging or steering household deposits into investment products, is fraught with risk.

The political temptation is obvious. Deposits represent a vast pool of capital: more than €10 trillion across the EU. If even a fraction could be redirected into corporate bonds, infrastructure funds, or securitised products, it would provide a massive injection of liquidity into European markets. But this temptation must be resisted. Once governments begin to see household deposits as a policy tool rather than a private asset, the line between encouragement and coercion becomes dangerously thin.

The future introduction of a digital euro (CBDC) adds a new dimension. A CBDC is programmable. It can carry rules, incentives, restrictions, and automated flows. While current proposals emphasise privacy and user control, the technical reality is that CBDCs enable a level of oversight and intervention that traditional deposits do not.

This does not mean the EU intends to seize deposits or force investments soon. There is no legal basis for such actions today. But the combination of political rhetoric (‘lazy money’), policy direction (mobilising savings), and technological capability (programmable CBDCs) create a future scenario where depositors may fear that their money could be nudged, steered, or disincentivised if left in low‑risk accounts.

Fear, not policy, is what triggers bank runs. Bank runs do not require actual confiscation or forced investment. They require only the belief that such actions might occur. Europe has seen this repeatedly. In Cyprus in 2013, bail‑in fears triggered mass withdrawals. Two years later in Greece, capital controls led to panic. In the United Kingdom in 2007, Northern Rock rumours alone caused queues around the block and fears that it could spread to other financial institutions.

If depositors begin to suspect that their savings may be subject to political experimentation, or that CBDC wallets may one day carry incentives or restrictions that disadvantage traditional deposits, they may withdraw pre‑emptively. Even a small percentage of households acting on fear could destabilise banks, especially in countries with already fragile financial sectors. Trust is the oxygen of banking. Once it is depleted, collapse follows quickly.

Another danger lies in the moral hazard created when governments attempt to steer private savings toward politically favoured sectors. If household deposits are funnelled, whether through incentives, regulatory pressure, or default options, into corporate or infrastructure investments, the government becomes a de facto allocator of private capital.

This raises several concerns.

First, political allocation is rarely efficient, because governments may favour projects based on political priorities rather than market viability. Second, risk is transferred from institutions to households. Citizens become the shock absorbers for corporate defaults, market downturns, or policy failures. Third, accountability becomes blurred. If investments fail, who is responsible? The bank? The government? The depositor who never wanted to invest? Fourth, market discipline erodes because the corporations may rely on politically channelled capital rather than competitive performance. This is not a path toward a dynamic, competitive European economy. It is a path toward politicised finance.

Household deposits represent autonomy. They allow individuals to choose when and how to spend, save, or invest. When policymakers frame deposits as ‘lazy’ or ‘idle’, they implicitly challenge this autonomy. They suggest that citizens should not be trusted to manage their own money responsibly. This paternalistic attitude is deeply problematic. It risks alienating savers, undermining trust, and creating resentment toward institutions that are supposed to protect financial stability, not manipulate it.

If Europe normalises the idea that household deposits are a policy lever, it sets a precedent that future governments, including future Australian governments, may exploit. Today, the goal may be investment. Tomorrow, it could be climate compliance, energy generation, consumption control, or social engineering. Programmable money makes these scenarios technically feasible, even if politically unthinkable today. The safeguard against such misuse is not technology. It is trust. And trust is fragile.

Europe’s (and Australia’s) investment challenges are real. But the solution cannot be to treat household deposits as ‘lazy money’ waiting to be mobilised. Deposits are not idle; they intentionally reflect caution, prudence, and the desire for security in an uncertain world. Europe must invest in competitiveness, innovation, and market reform, not in narratives that blame savers for structural shortcomings. The banking system depends on trust. Once lost, it cannot be easily restored.

The EU should abandon the rhetoric of ‘lazy money’ and reaffirm a simple principle: household deposits belong to households, not to policymakers, not to corporations, and not to political agendas. Anything less risks a crisis of confidence that Europe cannot afford.

It can only be hoped that Australian politicians too understand this message.

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