Xi Jinping’s meeting today in Shenzhen with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin has been breathlessly described as a ‘Yalta 2.0’. The unprecedented trilateral meeting hardly needs to live up to this label for its symbolism to matter: the Presidents of a former hegemon, mired in a war of choice and domestic opposition, and a regional power as belligerent as it is in decline, granted an audience in a hyper-surveilled megacity of robots and drone swarms by arguably the most powerful man in the world.
In Britain, the geopolitical reality this reflects – and its profound implications for our politics, society, and place in the world – does not seem to have sunk in. Few would contest the fact that the kind of influence Britain wielded when Churchill had a seat at Yalta has long been a thing of the past. However, accepting long-term decline relative to America is one thing. Coming to terms with the reality and true implications of our rapid eclipse by China is quite another. Ours is a strange China debate in which media outlets and think tanks talk continuously about the country’s rise, yet in which Whitehall has suffered an ‘exodus’ of China expertise and the government’s longstanding framework for China, ‘compete, cooperate, challenge’, is a triumph of equivocatory comms over serious policy.
China acts in China’s interests, as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party
It at once encapsulates both a fear of making hard decisions in the long-term national interest and an almost magical belief that repeatedly acknowledging that China is economically important but also a security threat will make the problem go away. It is a formula which, the longer it is entrenched, could have existential consequences.
These consequences will go far beyond what the security services rightly warn us about: Chinese espionage, influence operations, transnational repression and the like. They will also go beyond the immediate economic challenges posed by Chinese exports such as EVs – identified as a key challenge by a welcome report from Parliament’s Business and Trade Committee. These China issues are manageable, bounded problems that are urgent but which do not prompt too much questioning of our basic frames of reference. One solution proposed in the report, for instance, is an ‘insistence on fair trade’. A similarly comforting but dangerous complacence lurks behind every recourse to the liberal order, democratic values, international law, or human rights that populates our China debate. This masks the real problem.
The man holding court in Shenzhen does not do ‘universal values’, and his country is now sufficiently powerful and influential that that concept should be recognised for the historically contingent fiction that it is.
China acts in China’s interests, as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party. It does so while accounting for a third of global manufacturing, controlling global supply chains including those vital for modern digital and defence technologies, dominating global commercial shipping while possessing the world’s largest (and growing) navy, leading the world in green energy while at the forefront of civil nuclear and fusion power research, generating a third of the world’s electricity, and by some measures possessing a lead over the United States in almost all fields of emerging technology research.
China is the largest trading partner for most countries, including US allies beyond Europe; those like the UK for which this is not the case invariably depend on it upstream. Beijing enjoys massive geopolitical and geoeconomic influence across the non-Western world, much of which supports its stance on Taiwan. China is the only country to simultaneously produce two models of fifth-generation fighter jet, and to do so in quantities that may well place the PLA Air Force ahead of its US counterpart within the next decade. It is an expanding nuclear power with world-leading missile technology and advanced space, cyber, and undersea capabilities. While currently lagging the US by a few months on frontier AI, its rollout of the technology alongside robotics across society and the economy has the potential to cement China’s manufacturing and supply chain dominance through automation.
All of this is in line with the CCP’s strategy to lead the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ and, in doing so, surge ahead of the rest of the world while also solving China’s myriad domestic problems. So far, the first part of this strategy is proving successful. It is worth bearing in mind that even if the second is not – if China never achieves general living standards on par with the West or never matches the US in absolute GDP – this will not necessarily prevent China from surpassing the US in geopolitical power. We need a China strategy that takes the possibility of Chinese global leadership seriously.
Joining the dots across China’s achievements and capabilities reveals that it is in a position enjoyed by very few powers throughout history. It is simultaneously an economic behemoth on which the rest of the world depends, an increasingly capable maritime power, and a leader in transformative information, manufacturing, and energy technologies with the potential to implement these at unrivalled scale. The historical equivalent would be 18th-century Britain forecasting the potential of the industrial revolution and how it would intersect with its growing empire, and systematically planning how to take the project forward to maximum effect.
The arrival of an economically and technologically superior power, especially when it coincides with mounting domestic economic, political, and cultural challenges, is the kind of historical process which disrupts societies and topples political systems. The expansion of the industrialised West spelled the end for empires that had endured for centuries but were no longer able to keep up; a serious China strategy would focus on how to prevent this from happening to us. It would acknowledge that we cannot compete, and that instead we must plan for how we would adapt so as to secure our interests in a world in which China sets the terms.
We should of course be ruthless in responding to Chinese espionage and transnational repression within our borders. We must protect what is left of our industry and rebuild it to be sovereign and secure. But we must be willing to do so with effort and resources that match the scale of the challenge. The implications of China’s rise are without precedent in modern British history, and adapting successfully will require wholesale reorientation of government, society, and the economy. An insistence on fair trade or whatever other values we cling to will do no more to help us than it would have protected Indian weavers from the impact of the cotton mills.
Most urgently, we must entrench awareness of Chinese strategy and CCP behaviour among political, economic, and educational leaders, and with this foundation we must talk to China. We cannot understand the true nature of the challenge without regular dialogue across government, business, research, defence, and beyond. We must have a sense of what we would want our role to be in a world no longer shaped by our values, and a plan for ensuring we can retain those values at home. A real China strategy is not a foreign policy nice-to-have. It is a requirement for national survival.
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